Introduction
Many of the "new" theories in economics analyze the role of positive feedback. This is true of "new" growth theories as well as "new" trade theories. Positive feedback has aroused interest in economics since it may lead to multiple equilibria and since it may amplify the effect of exogenous variables on equilibrium outcomes.
Theories involving positive feedback are often developed using models in which all individuals are assumed to have identical objectives (payoff functions).
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The use of such models is usually regarded as an innocuous simplification.
However, two recent papers claim that the lack of payoff heterogeneity is actually crucial for amplification and multiple equilibria. Schmutzler (1998) and Herrendorf, Valentinyi, and Waldmann (2000) construct games with a choice of two actions in which payoff heterogeneity dampens the effect of changes in exogenous variables on equilibrium outcomes (S98) and makes multiple equilibria less likely (HVW00).
These conclusions are driven by the fact that payoff heterogeneity diminishes the strength of positive feedback in their models.
Our objective is to better understand whether and how payoff heterogeneity might affect positive feedback, and thus amplification and multiplicity. We first
show that the results of S98 and HVW00 are driven by the fact that they focus on binary choice games. Positive feedback is affected by payoff heterogeneity in such games for two reasons. First, extreme heterogeneity implies that the utility implications of the two possible choices differ so much that, in the limit, each 2 We focus on uncorrelated heterogeneity of the payoff function in full information games. Modelling heterogeneity as correlated shocks across individuals gives rise to some additional effects, not discussed here, which are particularly relevant in the case of incomplete information. See Shin (1998, 2002) and Chamley (1999) .
individual will take one of the two actions regardless of the choices of others. That is, extreme heterogeneity implies that each player is unaffected by the strategic complementarities which, as is well understood, are necessary for positive feedback and multiple equilibria (Cooper and John (1988) Extreme payoff heterogeneity also eliminates amplification and multiplicity in continuous action games with a bounded choice set because it implies that, in the limit, all individuals are always on the boundary of their choice set independently of the behaviour of others. Hence, again, extreme heterogeneity means that individuals are unaffected by strategic complementarities. However, these claims about extreme heterogeneity are all limiting arguments which require imposing unchanging bounds on the choice space without imposing any bounds on the allowable degree of heterogeneity. Moreover, there is no sense in which payoff heterogeneity smoothes aggregate behaviour in continuous action games. We show that with a continuous choice set, positive feedback may either be amplified or weakened by heterogeneity, depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition.
A Game with Strategic Complementarities and Heterogeneity
We ask how payoff heterogeneity affects feedback in a framework based on the simultaneous-move game of Cooper and John (1988) , henceforth CJ88. This is the simple, transparent context in which the concept of strategic complementarities was first defined. While S98 and HVW00 work with dynamic models, in each paper the relevant properties of the dynamics turn out to hinge on the properties of an underlying static game equivalent to the one analyzed here, so little is lost by working with the static game itself. There is a continuum of individuals of measure
one. An individual's payoff depends on her own action x X ∈ and on the actions of others; for simplicity, we focus on the case where only the mean action x of others matters. Payoffs also depend on an individual characteristic z. The distribution of z among individuals is given by ( ) F z , and the density, where it exists, is called ( ) f z .
We consider equilibria of the game in which individuals simultaneously choose x to maximize the payoff ( , , ) V x x z .
We will make the following assumptions on the utility function: 0, 0, and 0
We assume that V and these derivatives are bounded and continuous. The derivative xz V will govern how strongly marginal utility is affected by the individual characteristic z. We bound xz V away from zero to ensure that differences in z can have an impact on behaviour; otherwise heterogeneity in z would be of no interest.
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The most important assumption here is that 0 xx V > : a rise in the average choice x increases every individual's marginal utility of x. This is the assumption that CJ88
call strategic complementarities. Strategic complementarities are crucial for the way that average choices feed back upon individual choices, as we now show.
Suppose all players believe that the average choice will be x . The individual best response y is given by ( , ) argmax ( , , )
The average choice y which would be made in response to a conjectured average choice x , which we will call the aggregate best response function, is then
The points where the aggregate best response function crosses the 45 o line are the equilibria of the game.
The slope of the aggregate best response function shows how individuals' behaviour, on average, responds to changes in average behaviour; hence it is natural to define this slope as our measure of feedback. What interests us is not only the feedback at any given point, but also the width of the interval over which a given average or minimum feedback applies. Greater feedback in an interval around a stable equilibrium implies that the equilibrium adjusts more in response to an infinitesimal exogenous shock (a larger "multiplier", in the sense of CJ88); and if the interval is wide, then there is a large multiplier not only in response to infinitesimal shocks, but also to "large" shocks, as illustrated in Figure 1a .
Sufficiently strong positive feedback (at least equal to one) is also needed for multiplicity; and again the width of the interval of strong feedback matters, for it determines whether or not the two most widely separated equilibria differ significantly. If there exist two equilibria separated by distance r, then the average feedback over the interval between the equilibria must be one; also, if the average feedback on an interval of width r which contains an equilibrium is 1 φ > , then there exist multiple equilibria separated by at least r φ ; see Figure 1b . Thus by asking how heterogeneity affects feedback we address simultaneously the size of the "multiplier", as in S98, and the likelihood and economic significance of multiplicity, as in HVW00.
The main conclusion of CJ88 is that strategic complementarities are Note, though, that while strategic complementarities are necessary for positive feedback, they are not always sufficient. In this paper, we will want to consider both discrete choice problems and corner solutions to continuous choice problems. Hence (4) is not always the relevant condition to determine individual choice, and an infinitesimal change in average behaviour will not necessarily affect any given individual's behaviour. We will say that an individual is affected by strategic complementarities if there is some level of the aggregate choice x X ∈ at which the individual best response function ( , ) g x z is increasing in x . Thus we immediately observe: Proposition 1. If no individual is affected by strategic complementarities, then there is no positive feedback.
That is, unless some individuals' best response functions are increasing on X, the aggregate best response function cannot be increasing on X. This simple fact will be crucial when we study the impact of heterogeneity.
Effects of heterogeneity under binary choice
We first consider the effects of heterogeneity when individuals can choose between two actions only, "left" and "right"; hence we define the choice set as
Calling the choices 0 and 1 is a useful normalization because it means that the average choice x is equal to the measure m of individuals playing 1.
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Now suppose everyone believes that a measure m of players will choose 1.
Then it will be optimal for an individual with characteristic z to play 1 if
The strategic complementarity assumption, in the binary case, implies that ( , ) 0 m U m z > ; that is, playing 1 is more advantageous when more people play 1. Our assumptions on V also imply that U is bounded, with continuous first derivatives, and that the relative payoff to playing 1 is strictly decreasing in z:
As before, bounding z U away from zero ensures that heterogeneity matters for choice. Thus at any m there is a unique threshold Z such that everyone with characteristic z Z < plays 1, while those with z Z > play 0. Individuals whose characteristic is exactly equal to the threshold value are indifferent between 0 and 1.
The threshold value Z, as a function of m, is implicitly defined by the equation
In this binary context, the aggregate best response function describes the measure n of individuals who find it optimal to play 1 if everybody believes that a measure m of individuals will choose 1. Combining the threshold function ( ) Z m with the distribution ( ) F z of characteristics in the population, our previous definition (3) of the aggregate best response function simplifies to
The aggregate best response function ( ) Since the aggregate best response function is a transformation of the cumulative distribution function F, it is clear that heterogeneity may play an important role in determining feedback. Exactly how, though, do we define heterogeneity? There is no universally accepted definition, so we pick our definition for analytical convenience. 5 We regard a population as heterogeneous if the density function is fairly flat, while a spike in the density, or a point mass, implies homogeneity. Hence a possible measure of homogeneity is the total absolute variation A of the density function:
Here we defined homogeneity over the whole real line, but it can also be usefully defined over a smaller interval, by changing the limits of integration. Notice that under our definition, A is infinite if there is any point mass (a group of exactly identical people) in the distribution, and if we define A over the whole real line,
. Thus also, increasing heterogeneity without bounds means driving 5 Our definition of homogeneity is a special case of the definition proposed in Kneip (1999) . By defining homogeneity, of course, we implicitly define its opposite, heterogeneity.
the density function to zero everywhere. That is, a sequence of distributions i F for which i A approaches zero implies densities i f which approach zero pointwise.
We now see that the feedback at a given point m can be decomposed into two factors, one relating to strategic complementarity, and the other to heterogeneity.
Taking the derivative of the aggregate best response function, we have:
The factor '( ) / Similarly, (1) This result is likely to be relevant for some contexts, but its generality is questionable since it arises only as we approach the limit. A great deal of dispersion of z may be needed to eliminate multiplicity if ( ) Z m is steep. Thus it is interesting to ask whether there is any other mechanism by which lesser degrees of heterogeneity also diminish feedback. The answer is yes, as we see by reconsidering As we prove this result, we hold fixed the number of individuals affected by strategic complementarities, ( (1)) Our results so far remind us, as we already know from CJ88, that the key ingredient for positive feedback is strategic complementarity. Multiple equilibria may be created by compositional effects under weak strategic complementarities, and this multiplicity will not be robust to heterogeneity. However, if the cause of multiplicity is strong strategic complementarity, then as long as we fix the number of individuals affected by these strategic complementarities, even a uniform distribution of z (among those affected) does not eliminate multiplicity. Our uniqueness result arises only as we drive the fraction of individuals affected by strategic complementarities to zero.
Effects of heterogeneity under continuous choice
Next, consider how our results extend to the case of a continuum of possible actions. Is there any way in which weaker forms of heterogeneity also diminish feedback? In the continuous choice model, the answer is no. Individual behavior is not inherently discontinuous in this case, so we cannot construct a jump in aggregate behaviour through compositional effects, and there is no analogue to Proposition 3.
Instead, calculating the slope of the aggregate best response function (2) for this case shows us a different way in which changes of the distribution affect feedback:
This integral immediately implies (Rothschild and Stiglitz, (1971) There are no economic reasons to restrict the convexity/concavity properties of the policy function slope ( , )
x g x z with respect to z, so the bottom line of Proposition 6 is that mean-preserving spreads affect feedback ambiguously. Note that although we do not view mean-preserving spreads as a good way of ordering heterogeneity in general 8 , some decreases in homogeneity A are mean-preserving spreads, so ambiguity with respect to mean-preserving spreads also implies ambiguity with respect to our homogeneity measure A. Hence Proposition 6 shows that for a continuous, unbounded choice space, an increase in heterogeneity may increase or decrease feedback at some or all points. The same conclusion applies For still more ambiguity, note that the equilibrium point(s) x * may move when the distribution changes, so that even if we can sign the effect on the feedback at all points, we are not sure what happens to feedback at the equilibrium point(s).
Conclusions
It has been proposed that we should be skeptical of economic arguments based on positive feedback, because, in some cases, feedback is weakened or eliminated by payoff heterogeneity. This paper has characterized the set of models in which this concern is justified. If we are willing to impose unbounded amounts of heterogeneity in payoffs, while fixing and bounding the choice set, then indeed, feedback is eventually eliminated. Also, we know that in the binary choice case, stronger feedback can be constructed in homogeneous models than in heterogeneous models.
However, in continuous choice models, no such mechanism applies. Thus while there are some circumstances in which payoff heterogeneity weakens positive 8 Compare a uniform distribution on [0,1] to a pair of equal point masses at 0 and 1. The latter is a mean-preserving spread of the former, but it is not necessarily convincing to say feedback, there is no reason to believe that representative agent models with positive feedback are vulnerable to heterogeneity in general. 
